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I. Meaning of the“China Problem”， scope of discussion 
誼 idmethod 
The China Problem bas come to the critrcal point. Many a 
solutroils were offered, but all have been consistently and uncom-
promisingly refused by the two existing Chinese entities判.Though 
changing circumstances objectively require a way out of the dead-
lock, with the natural tendency of disregarding to some extent the 
stern attitudes of the two Chinese entities, at this very moment 
it must be frankly admitted that there remams no probability of 
overcommg the China Dilemma. 
* Due to space, discussions about the actual practicability and political 
desirability of a possible solution admitted in law a目 leftfor future 
demonstrations in a more complete form 
The word “juridical”is used in the present article as the antithetic 
term against the pahtical The word “pohtical，” when used with 
quotation marks, will have a broader sense as to include economic, 
social, mihtary, and psychologic, etc. aspects of the China Problem 
which are mixed in considerations of strategy and tactics m the process 
of policy-making by third States toward China And this is to be 
understood on purely conceptual dimension and in a metaphorical sense-
that the economic, social, etc streams differing in origin meet at the 
estuary of the "political”nver as against the“juridical”bank m the 
making of a foreign pohcy. 
紳 Inthis paper, the Chinese State is signified by the word "Chma” 
without modi五cation,while the two existing Chinese entities are refer-
red to as“the Nationahst Side" and “the Communist Sideヘwithout
quotation marks. 
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In the scholarly circle, solut10ns, amazmg as they are both m 
quantity and in quality, lead one to associate the China Problem 
with puzzle, with gibbering, and with mystery. This phenomenon 
comes less from the fact that this Problem 1s unique as well 
as unprecedented, than from the fact that such solutions so sug-
gested are necessary conclusions of ideological preoccupations of 
respective researchers who made them. And the etiological cause 
1s that the term”China Problem”1s deemed as something self-
evident, hence it 1s kept ambiguous at the very beginmng 
intentionally or unconsciously 
Besides the ever-advanc,ng factor of Time, there are two inter 
related factors m al international problems, viz., Space and 
Relat10n Indeed, problems, of whatever nature they may be, are 
al subject to Time as one kind of force majeure, because they 
are destined to be resolved sooner or later through one way or 
the other. The Chma Problem cannot be the only exception to 
this truth; and doubtlessly the best and the most certain means 
to solve the China Problem is time itself. But facing the highly 
tens10nal world-situat10n of today one cannot a百ordawa1tmg the 
mercy of the Supreme Category, at the expense of a possible 
solution which may bring forth secular, though relative, sat1sfac-
t10ns to most of al. 
If this 1s so, then Time is taken as the potential and v1S1onal 
gmde for long-range policy, but is excluded from cons1derat10n m 
our discussion process through which to search for another line of 
a China-policy at the present stage wh比hmay in turn cast l!ght 
on the road leading to a solut10n, imperfect as it may be, admis-
sible in international law as objective existence, m contrad1stin・
ct10n to“political”judgements which are largely subject to Time 
as the historical controller. 
In e旺ect,there remain two factors Space and Relation. In the 
China Problem, they bear distinct implications, thus provide the 
Problem with sped百cmeanmg. every State is at her own peculiar 
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stand vis-a-vis Chma with reference to her non-human contiguity 
with Chma (e.g., geopolitical, tactical considerations) and to their 
human (mutual) attractiveness (e g., historic cultural, ethn'c, com-
mercial considerations). 
With the above at the background, as material the disposal of 
wh'ch is the ob]ective〔notnecessarily “aim") of a foreign policy, 
the China Problem takes many forms before many States. It fol-
lows that 1f we have a Chma Problem for USA and another for 
USSR, we also have a China Problem for Japan, and even one for 
each of the two existing Chinese entities, mstead of having 
“the”China Problem as a generalized abstraction. Accordmgly, 
the content of the Chma Problem is also different from State to 
State, in that some of its ISsues・ may to some States be so 
important that compromise is beyond question as it may 
endanger their national survival, while to other States such 1s-
sues, and even the Chma Problem as a whole, may not be the 
least detrimental to their nat10nal interests. Such specific meaning 
is substantially decisive of the measure of desirability of a solution 
for di百erentStates Desirability of a certa;n solution 副首ersfrom 
one State to another, hence the China pohcy of a State 1s bound to 
di百erfrom that of another. It stands to reason that desirability IS 
matter of degree. And 1f these are correct, then, on the one hand, 
analogy of a State’s position 〔actionor maction〕asconfronted 
by the ιhina Problem (or some issues thereof) with another 
State’s, IS a cancer for understanding of the Problem, as such 
analogy is, m nearly al cases, mistaken, on the other hand, 
a“more”desirable solution to the Problem should take as its 
barometer the greatest common measure of attitudes of most 
States, includmg China herself (note that some States may not 
be in need of de自ningthe China situation, but nevertheless are 
in a position to decide on theロ1atterof recognition and hold votes 
in the Umted Nations General Assembly which determines the 
' Chmese representation rnsue). This is the frst di伍cultyfor a 
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solution to be realized 
In this regard, experience teaches somethmg The failures of 
the attempted two-Chma solution (in the form of“one old China, one 
new Chinaヘandthat of ‘＇one Chma, one Formosa”）， the no・Chma 
solut10n Cm the form of“successor States”）， and the“mdependent 
Formosa by Formosans”solution 〔bymeans of revolut10n, coup 
d’etat, or plebiscite), show us that any solution to the China 
Problem, to be practical (m a quantitative sense, that 1s, m the 
sense of“more probable of realizationヘforthere has never been 
a perfect solution to an mternat10nal problem〕，shouldfulfil some 
specific condit10ns These condit10ns are, inter alia : (1〕that,
against the status quo in China, it should be r田 sonablymore ac 
ceptable to the Chmese State, namely, that it should not ignore 
the self-determmation of the Chmese people，〔2)that under the 
present state of world affairs, 1t should be more desirable to third 
States and to the international society, that 1s, that it should be 
one able to attract supports from as many States as possible, and 
(3〕that,above al, it should be possible at al, within the limits 
of existing mternational law. 
The last condit10n, important as 1t 1s, is too often overlooked. 
This is one of the causes responsible for the failures, and is 
perhaps the deadly error givmg rise to the present China Dilemma. 
Here, two points need be explamed, seeing that they are conse-
quential for correct mastering of the China Problem. 
( 1 ) The first pomt is the solutions heretofore suggested met 
with failures chiefly, and probably solely, because of oppositions 
from the two Chinese entities. The reason, and the only reason, 
that supports such oppositions is that there is, and can only be, 
one China including Formosa as integral part. And though on ap-
l'earance the solutions failed as a result of“political”cons1dera 
tions, in substanζe they so failed because the one-China insistence 
seems more convincing to the policy-makers of third States, 、
although it would be more logical that proofs be given before 
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'Such insistence be admitted as correct. But the one-Chma insistence 
・can stand only and insofar as Formosa 1s under Chmese sove-
reignty, for it is exactly the co existen日 ofthe two Chinese 
・entities, each of which claims to be the only government representmg 
China and which are respectively so recognized by groups of States, 
that is the source of the China Problem itself and the precondit10n 
to the contmuation of the existence of same. And whether 
Formosa is or 1s not under Chmese sovereignty can be determined 
solely by mternational legal norms on territory (transfer of ter-
ritonal title, cession, etc.〕， hence1t is a 1undiral question. In 
this sense, whether there 1s smgular Chma or plural China (one, 
two, or one-and・a-ha!f, Chinas) becomes a 1uridi回 Iquest10n neces-
'Sitates, and its answer determines, considerations on the issue of 
recognit10n or non recognition of the two Chmese entitie and the 
issue of UN Chinese representation, which are juridi国 Iquest10ns 
before they are subject to pohtical expediency. 
(2〕 Thesecond point will be a proof to the above statement 
1t is said by al who write on the Problem, that the two issues, 
and to us the two substantial ones, of the China Problem, namely 
the issue of recogmtion or non-recognition and of the UN Chmese 
representat10n, are matters of foreign pohcies of third States But 
foreign policy seen from functional standpomt is the balancer in 
the everlasting struggle between law and politics in the mterna-
tional sphere, and is adjustment technique against disagreement 
between formal legal reality and changeable political facts on in-
ternational plane. This descript10n is in turn justi日ed,in that m-
ternational legal obligations delimitate freedom of actions of States 
m their relat10ns with .one another or, what amounts to the same 
thing, m that international law is an external restrictive condit10n, 
be it mimmum or maximum condit10n, in States’foreign・policy 
-making 
Consequently, before a Chma policy, with hasis on whatever 
:solution, can be made at al, there 1S a fundamental requirement: 
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pol!cy-makers must be sure that the solution on which he hases 
his policy-decision ought to be admitted by international law. 
Legal admissibility m our Problem is the necessary, though not 
at al the sufficient, condition to political desirabihty and actual 
practicability and al the three determine the decisional latitude 
(alternatives〕ofa Chma pohcy of a single State. 
Be this as it may, we must guard ourselves against legal form-
alism.Over emphasis on the law is tant町nountto makmg a dan 
gerous and unrealistic conservative bomb that may be liable for 
destroymg al possibihties of solving the China Problem, and is 
as muιh harmful as over-emphasis on the “political”which may 
lead to mternat10nal anarchy. It is true that a iundical norm. 
once given birth by compromise among political forces, exists 
mdependently of such political forces and in turn regulates poli-
tical actions, it is equally true that alteration of political situation 
may bring change, or necessity for change, to a Jund比alnorm. 
This is another special meaning of the Chma Problem which adds 
more difficulties to a solution. The Chma situat10n remains as 
it is, no solution which may be the permanent golden means in 
the choice between the juridical and pohtical weights, is yet 
con<eivable, not to say practicable, though some such once and 
for al solution may not be legally madm1ss1ble. 
Hence we must confess that our work is a sp田ulahve阻 ddi伍cult
one. But the situation is not at al hopeless Under the circumstances, 
a solution to the China Problem must be cut into two parts：自rst,
to search for a possible lme admissible in law; and second, to base 
political desirability and actual practicability on such legally admit 
ted line of possibihty〔orpossibihties〕 Thepresent article 1s of-
fered to the first one. The second part, though vital, is beyond 
the scope here 
From the above, our method becomes evident. It will be a 1uri-
dical one, normative logical analysis, through which to deduce a 
line of possibility, if any, for solving the China Problem allowable 
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at mternat10nal law as a logical system of norms. And, m view 
of the changmg political situation and of the static nature of 
legal norms, we may face discrepancies between law and politics, 
・Or the question of adaptability of law to fact. For the purpose of 
avoiding such senous quest10n, which is the sub3ect for the work 
of the second part of a solution to the China Problem, and with 
a view to making our method workable, we abstain from pred1-
eting the dynamic future of the China Dispute, which is 
ch田1geablein form and in content from State to State, and is 
susceptible of an ultimate form of settlement in the course of 
time, and arcept the reality of the present status quo in China as 
.a static phenomenon at this historical moment. Thus we crystal-
11ze the China Problem, and make possible a 3uridical analysis of 
the common form and content. It 1s with this method that we 
have “the”Chma Problem for static and objective observat10n. 
II. The prerequisite to a solution-Fam脚 a’sjuridical 
status as territory ( I ) 
The two most senous barriers on the way of forming a solut10n 
to the China Problem are (1) that the two Chinese rival p町t1田町e
<!til engaged in an armed arg田nentin the battlefield of “legitimacy”， 
•and (2) that, like 1t or not, Chma 1s not a Poland Correspond-
ingly, the focus of the Chma Problem 1s“how many Chinas"', 
'and the central, decisive issue 1s the quest10n as to Formosa's 
iuridical status as territory （“Formosa”being meant also to in-
dude the 1Sles of the Pescadores). The quest10n is, therefore, whe-
ther Formosa is or is not Chma’s territory. Insofar as the status 
・of Formosa remams unknown, the two other issues of the China 
Problem, namely, quest10ns of recogmtion and UN Chinese repre・
•sentat10n, can have no answers. 
The latter two issues町etwo different sides of the s田neques-
tion: what is the status of the Nationalist Side and that of the 
・Communist Side? They町emore political than juridical (i. e. 
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matters of policy at the discretion of individual States〕，incontra-
distinct10n to the causal crux of the status of Formosa which 
is more juridical than political. In this sense, Formosa’s status. 
is the prerequisite of a solution to the China Problem, to which 
the other two issues belong as real material. 
The quest10n of Fomosa’s status belongs to the field of mterna-
tional law, before it goes into the field of internat10nal politics .
In fact, the pohtical status of Formosa as territory does not come 
into the picture. All those who asserted that Formosa's status is 
undetermined (with any sort of argument〕， hence that the 
question is subject to, and susceptible of, political action at 
a later stage by States concerned, have to rely on mternational 
law. They could not help alleging that according to internat10nal 
law Formosa had so far not come under full sovereignty of 
Chma, by reasomng that there had been no formal cession which,. 
and in their opin10n, which only, could make this formerly Japanese 
territory Chinese. With this nagative contention, they concluded 
that “the legal status of Formosa is undetermmed”，because inter-
natwnal law“dete口mnes”tothis effect. Here come the sugge-
stwns of condominium, terra nullius, extensive-belligerent occupa-
tion, UN trusteeship, and rule by-delegatwn (meaning that the, 
legal basis for the Nationalist rule over Formosa has been 
“delegation”from the Allied Powers of the Second World War〕，as.
theoretical mterpretat10ns on the reality of control over Fo口nosa 
by the Nationahst side. 
Agamst such negative arguments is the affirmative content10n 
from the two Chinese entities, with similar reasons. The・ 
Natwnalist side held that Japan's aggressive war against China 
in the 1940’s nullified the Shimonoseki Peace Treaty of 1895 by 
which Chma had ceded Formosa, thus Formosa has remained Chinese, 
territory since 1895 and before. The Communist side, on the other 
hand, maintained that though Formosa had once formally been ceded 
to Japan through a pea re treaty, this ter口torybecame Chmese, 
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once more, as a consequence of the Cairo Declarat10n of 1943 and 
・the Potsdam Declaration of 1945 which determined that“Formosa 
shall be restored to China" There are also two other arguments. 
(1) Formosa was territory stolen by Japan from China’s 
Ch'ing Dynesty through the aggressive war of 1894, hence. it has 
never been Japanese territory legally；，〔2) since the Shimo-
noseki Peace Treaty was nullified by the peace treaty of 1952 be-
tween the Nationalist side representing China, on the one hand, 
and Japan, on the other, due to Article 4 of the latter peace treaty 
which states to the e旺ectthat al treaties, conventions and ar-
rangements made between Japan and China as before December 9, 
1941 shall, as a result of the war, be null and void, Formosa bas 
remained Cbinese (rather, was returned t凸Chma〕．
There is no space here for us to discuss the merits or demerits 
of the adove negative and a伍rmativeclaims. We need only say 
that they are al mistaken, in that their arguments are al beside 
the really important juridical point. As will be made clear, whe-
ther Formosa is Chmese territory, depends not on the peace treaty 
of 1952 between Japan and China, nor on the Cairo Declarat10n, 
nor on the Potsdam Declaration. Besides, the negative advocacies 
started from the conclusion that Formosa is not Chinese territory, 
and then found reasons in their support, and not from jundical 
logical analysis by which the conclusion may be drawn. With this 
in mmd, it seems not necessary to rebut the above contentions one 
after another. Su伍cesit to pomt out that the statements to the 
effect that Formosa becaine Chinese territory in 1952 is groundless 
and dangerous. It is groundless, because the confusion implied in 
this statement, of a war with a battle is juridically untenable and 
politically hurtful; and because an executed peace treaty, 
di百eredfrom other kmds of treaty, can never l:e nulli自edby a 
later peace treaty, even if such nullification be expressly mentioned. 
If such nullification could be just泊edm law, the basic norm 
Pacta sunt servanda (promise shall be kept) would fall to the 
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苦round,and there would te an anarchic world, and stable order 
would be a dream ; seemg that as a logical result of such state-
ment, w町 may be legal means of nullifymg former peace 
treaty. Agam, such statement is dangerous, because it suggests 
the possibility for one to contend, though illogically, that since 
the said 1952 p田 cetreaty was made after the commg into bemg 
of the Communist side on mainland, the Nationalist side may be 
conceived as a new State or government-in-exile and, in conse-
quence, that only the Communist side can represent the Chinese 
State (hence that there can be no more civil war in Chma, 
and that, as a matter of course, Formosa belongs to the Communist 
side). In short, such statement ,gives room to the stramed argu-
ment denying the continuity of the Chinese State and ignores the 
real status quo m China 
Exceptmg the Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty of 1952 as basis on 
which China could acquire sovereignty over Formosa, and we have 
three documents that may determme Formosa’s status (or may 
prove that Formosa's status is undetermmed). They are: the 
Cairo Declarat10n of 1943, the Potsdam Proclamation of July, 1945, 
and the Instrument of Surrender of Septemter, 1945. 
Owmg to the fact that Chma entered into, and thence has been 
in control of, the formerly Japanese territory of Formosa in 1945 
according to the terms of the above documents, the determinat10n 
of Formosa’S 1urid1cal status depends on whether these documents 
were iuridically valid ones that gave effect to a transfer of sovere-
ignty over Formosa from Japan to China. In other words, whether 
Formosa juridically has been determined to be Chinese territory 
or has remained undetermmed, depends on whether realization 
of those parts of contents of these documents concerning Formosa 
amounted to execution of legal obligation, with the result that 
Chinese sovereignty over Formosa was made complete, or otherwise 
In order to know the existence or non-existence of such legal 
obligation, we may resort to the forms and the contents of these 
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documents, or to the mtent10ns behind which such documents were 
made, or even to the backgrounds that may iustify a presumpt10n 
of such intentions. Now let us ex回目nethem one after .another 
and in the above manner. 
First JS the Cairo Declaration. It is clear enough at one sight 
that as a matter of form this document is not at al a juridical 
instrument. Above al, on appear阻 ce it does not take the 
・ordinary form of an mternational agreement, hence in form it 
may not be recogmzed as阻 internationalaccord bmding on the 
.,arties that made it，田dgives birth to obligations. But interna-
twnal law does not require that an international accord, to be 
bindmg, shall follow certain prescribed forms. In other words, 
1Jrov1ded that the content of a document (or even verbal 
exchange of words) has some m田ningjuridically relevant and 
sanct10nable〔that1s, when the p町 tiesconsented on something, 
.commission or omission, with obligafory consciousness), such docu『
ment, be it named a treaty, a convention, an agreement, an arran-
gement, or even a communique, 1s legally valid and binding upon 
the parties to it. Hence an internat10nal juridical accord may exist, 
even if the form of such accord may not be recognized as a treaty. 
But a study of the content of the Cairo Declarat10n rather 
strengthens our negat1 ve position that 1t can not be called a 
binding agreement. For, in this document, the wordings are so 
1oose and indefinite that nothing in it may impress us to recognize 
1ts iuridically bindmg force 
Following what have been said in the two previous paragraphs, 
we have to admit that the Cairo Declaration was neither an 
.agreement legally binding on the Principal Allied Powers which 
made it, nor on Japan which was the target State to which this 
Declarat10n had been meant to address. For Japan this document 
哨悼惜S加担γaliosacta. 
If this is so, then we must as'.< recourse from the intention of 
the makers of this Declaration, so as to ascertain its nature 
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On the intention behind the makmg of the Cairo Declaration, 
opm10ns among statesmen of several States di旺erfrom one pole to 
another. Some said that 1t was made to the world for clanficat10n 
of the pohtical intent10n (war aims), hence its content, matter 
of po hey and not of law (Eden,); some, that it was a promise 
to make some legally obhgatory agreerrient, that is, that it was 
an accord to make accord, Pactum de contγαhendo (Trumen, J. F 
Dulles); others said that it was made with the intention of 
giving nse to legal obligations, but that the clausula rebus sic 
stanttbus was applicable, that hence the Cairo Declaration lost 
its binding force (Churchill); and stil others, that it was, and 
remains, valid, effective, and binding ab tnitzo〔WangTsen-ting, 
Chou En-lai). 
Thus a search for the “mtention”provides us with no definite 
answer to our quest10n. Perhaps Churchill's opinion is the more 
reliable one, since he happened to be one of the Heads actually 
participating the conference that gave birth to the Cairo Declarat10n. 
However, the point as to whether the claus四la問bt詔 sicstantibus 
"1pplied, may lead to endless dispute For, this theory is political 
m nature, hence the judgement as to its applicability is highly 
subjective , and m fact 1t has long been troubling mternat10nal 
lawyers as to the objective criteria for its application. In short, 
m international law there has so far been no agreed criteria for 
the application of the clausu!aγebus sic stanttbus 
If we ran not百ndout a definite answer to our question as t<> 
the juridical (or 3und1cally irrelevant〕natureof the Cairo Decla-
rat10n, we may of course try to ascertain this point through obser・ 
vations into the background for the Declaration’s being made, 
which may prove or may justify a presumpt10n of the real inten・ 
tlon behind the Declarat10n. This would involve a long cham 
of iundical points the nature of the “Principal Alhed Powers" 
which made the Cairo Declarat10n, that is, whether they were 
combined as a umt, an organism the decision of which common 
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organ might be automatically bmding upon the member States; 
and, to know this we have to find out the basis for such combina-
tion, that is, whether they were so combmed by a war-time treaty 
of alliance, so that such combination was jundically relevant ; 
町id,since there had never been in existence of such treaty of 
ali祖国 amongal the Prmcipal Allied Powers in the Second: 
World War, we must study the jund1cal meanmg of the promise, 
they made to one another that they would not make separate, 
peace with the common enemy, so as to ascertam whether there 
existed such a treaty by tacit consent, etc. Besides, for the above 
purposes we might have to examine also the difference betwe聞
the “Principal Alhed Powers" and “the Umted Nat10ns”（m the 
Second World War) at large (the accessory co belligerents), as to 
their status and their rights as co victors, etc., etc. 市Vedo not 
have space to make these demonstrations. Su伍ces1t to say that 
the answer 1s most hkely to be the s町neas in the case of ex由主1
inat10ns on the form and content of the Cairo Declaration, and 
on the. intent10n behind its makmg. 
Consequently, we can not avoid the conclus1on that the Cair。
Declaration was not a legal document binding the States that made 
1t, but was a general commumque makmg known the determination 
on the war aims, war purposes, and the direction of post-war 
policy of the Principal Allied Powers toward the would-be defeated 
State (Japan〕. And if the Cairo Declaration is not a legally 
binding document, 1t certamly cannot have the legal effect 
of transferring Formosa from Japan to China. 
Ill. The prerequisite to a solution Form田正sjuridical 
status as territory (11) 
If the Cairo Declaration cannot be the juridical basis for de-
termining Formosa’s status, it remains to be seen whether the 
nature of the other two documents, namely the Potsdain Proc!a-
mation and the Instrument of Surrender, will lead us to the S町ne
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conclusrnn. 
As a matter of form, though the Proclamatrnn itself cannot be 
called a treaty or an agreement because it, pending a白 ept阻 ceby 
Japan, was legally non existent for Japan; 1t was at least田 offer
“agreed”upon as田nongthe Principal Allied Powers that made 1t, 
hence in so far as such Allied Powers were concerned 1t had the 
character of an international accord. Furthemore, in content, the 
wordings of this Proclamatrnn are such that one is impressed that 
it was meant to be binding at least upon the parties that had 
made 1t. Such terms like“We＂，“the Alliesヘ“conferred”， and
“agreed”， and the concreteness of the“terms”for uncond1t10nal 
surrender, etc., are similar to those which are used in treaties, hence 
they lead to an affirmative possibility of confirming the jund1cal 
nature of this Proclamation as a whole. However, 1t must s 
reminded that the obligatory nature of this document remains 
<inly m the realm of the possible or the presumable, therefore, 
more proofs are needed. 
To begin with, if the Potsdam Proclamation be P1・1ma facie a 
1egal document, then the content of the Cairo Declaration, which 
is part of the Potsdam Proclamation (Item h〕， wouldalso become 
bindmg. 
The pomt is, therefore, that even the Heads of States who made 
the Potsdam Proclamat10n, made it with the intentrnn that it 
would bind their respective States, that for several years after 1945 
al believed that this do印 mentwas binding, that the contents 
of this document were m reality executed (m part, and not in 
total, accordmg to the negativists about Chinese sovereignty over 
Fo口nosa)bona fide, and that it was made publicly and hence is 
something different from the Yalta Agreement; how did it happen 
that it became normatively binding, and not only “possible”or 
“believed”to be so' In other words, what is the legal basis for 
this Proclamation to produce JU口dicalohligat10ns? 
This relates matter of procedure through which a bmding accord 
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comes into being. There are two possibilities：〔1) the Potsdam 
Proclamation was an agreement to make an agreement; (2) it was 
itself a treaty (or an agreement) among the parties, namely，町nong:
the Principal Alhed Powers that made 1t. 
The Iog1cal consequence of the五rstposs1b1hty is this, that, 
since this was an agreement to make an agreement, and not the・ 
agreement itself, the breaking of such promise to make the agre-
ement was matter of internat10nal morality, or that, even 1£ the 
Potsdam Proclamation be considered a legal document, the non-
fulfilment of some obligat10ns, intei-alia, to restore Formosa t。
Chma, remams State respons1bihties of the parties (other th由工
China herself) to the Proclamat10n, and that, therefore, the non-
fulfilment itself did not have any legal effect on the transfer of 
sovereignty over Formosa from Japan to China. 
The implication of the second possibility given above is that, 
even if the Potsdam Proclamation was a treaty田nongthe parties,. 
besides the reason given m the last clause of the previous parag-
raph, it had nothmg to do with the transfer of such sovereignty 
because what China got under Item h of the Proclamat10n -that Ja-
pan shall carry out the stipulations of the Cairo Declarat10n (Parag-. 
raph 4, that Formosa shall be restored to Chma)-was only one kind. 
of expectation nght, or that such right was restricted by a condition 
precedent, and not nght問問m(that 1s, not ownership on property); 
for, the argument may go on, the realization of the content of such 
nght, hence the exercise of same, would become legal impossibility,. 
hence free the other parties from legal obligations under the 
Potsdam Proclamation, 1£ and so far as Japan could not or did 
not transfer to China the sovereignty over Formosa. 
The above arguments are quite vahd, hence we must conclude. 
that the Potsdam Proclamation, even 1f it be a treaty, could 
not be legal basis for Chmese sovereignty over Formosa. The 
most we can say is only that, the p町 tiesto the Proclamat10n 
(exceptmg Chma if she was not responsible for the impos-
124 
sibility of transfer of sovereignty over Formosa) are under legal 
obligations to make the returning of Formosa to Chma more 
probable, and that therefore they are under legal obligation not to 
impede such transfer of sovereignty, and, a fortio円，nottooppose 
such transfer nor to deny Chmese sovereignty over Formosa if 
transfer has been made. In short, they are estopped in the mat 
ter. 
However, seeing tbat Japan did in fact sign the Instrun-ent of 
Surrender on September 2, 1945, in which Instrument it 1s pro-
vided (m item f) that Japan “undertake to carry out”bona fide 
i:he stipulations of the Potsdam Proclamation (hence the content of 
i:he Cairo Declarat10n〕， thePotsdam Proclamation rr:ay be ιon 
"Sidered aιomplete treaty adhered to by Japan through her signing 
-of the Instrument of Surrender, or be considered not as a treaty, 
but as an offer by the Principal Allied Powers as a whole on this 
speci五cmatter (ad hoc) which was accepted by Japan through 
her signmg of the Instrument of Surrender. That 1s to say, the 
・Cairo Declaration, the Potsdam Proclamat10n, and the Instrument 
-of Surrender read as a whole, and there comes into existence a 
treaty among the Allied Powers and Japan, or between the former 
as one party and Jai;an as another party. In this sense, the Cairo 
Declaration made known the politico-m11itary aims, purposes, and 
post-war policy of the Allied Powers; the Potsdam Proclamation 
・turned them into the terms of a treaty (or an offer) ; and the 
Instrument of Surrender made Japan an adhering party〔ormdae 
・the whole a treaty) Whether such “tr白ty”wasa multilateral 
-one or a bilateral one, does not have factual importance for our 
present purpose of ascertammg Formosa’s status What does matter 
is that internat10nal law does not say that a treaty, to be a treaty 
valid in law, ought to bear the prescribed names Even oral offer 
and acceptance make a treaty. What is counted is not the 
“name”but the content which constitutes an accord givmg birth 
・to obligat10ns legally sanctionable. That Japan had no choice 
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but to adhere to such treaty (or to accept such offer〕，hencethat 
Japan was under duress when she signed the Instrument of 
Surrender, 1s beyond question, because this is similar to the signing 
of a peace treaty, or to servmg of a counter-declaration of war, 
to which internat10nal law admits duress and gives validity 
Furthermore, the fact that m a later period some of the parties 
denied that the Cairo Declaration and/or the Potsdam Procla 
mation were bmding documents, or contended that even if they 
had once been mtended to be bindmg they became void due to 
vital change of circumstances, does not make any difference in 
law. For, if at the time of making the Potsdam Proclamation the 
parties had intended it to be legally binding, it became source of 
1uridical production (at the time of its being made on July 26, 
1945 or as soon as Japan signed the Instrument of Surrender on 
September 2, 1945) completely mdependent of changes of will by 
the parties at a later period. In addition, if Formosa be conceived 
to have become Chinese territory through a provision of the Sino 
Japanese Peace Treaty of 1952, there might be ground for arguing 
that, smce in 1949 there occurred vital change of circumstances 
in China due to the commg into existence of the Communist side 
which claims to represent Chma, the principle rebitS sic stantz bus 
apphed, hence treaty obligat10ns under the Cairo Declaration and/ 
or the Potsdam Proclamation became void and, in result, Formosa’s 
status remains undetermined (see Churchill’s opinion referred to 
m the above〕.One step further, the said date of Formosa’s 
becoming Chinese territory (1952〕mayeven give nse to another 
.cJaim from some parties to the Potsdam Proclamation, to the ef-
fect that it is China herself that made the transfer of sovereignty 
over Formosa to China Juridically impossible or politically difficult, 
and that hence they may not be obligated to make such transfer 
of sovereignty more probable. However, this zs not the case. 
Formosa had already become Chinese territory on September 20, 
1945, when the Nationalist side, then the only legitimate govern-
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ment representing China, based on the Potsdam Proclamation, deeト
ared Formosa a province of Chma without any opposition from 
any State, before change of circumstances m China took place in 
1949. Thus, physical transfer of sovereignty over Formosa from 
Japan to China being completed on October 25, 1945 when China 
entered into Formosa, the provision of the Potsdam Proclamat10n 
regarding Formosa was executed, there is no room for ap-
phcat1on of the claztsula rebus sic stantibus resorted to under the 
condition of“vital change of circumstances" which occurred m 1949-
It must be added 1mmed阻telythat, while the Nationalist side 
entered into Formosa in October, 1945 upon the basis of the Pot-
sdam Proclamation as an mter・nationalaccord, and it received sur-
render from Japanese army there on the basis of General Mc 
Arthur’s Directive Number One 〔issueby Japanese government as 
General Order No. l〕whichin turn was executing the Instrument 
of Surrender (item f), its declarmg Formosa a Chinese province 
might be based on its own belligerent nght coming from ji目 bellz
1f the other Principal Allied Powers were, as having been demo 
nstrated, debarred from saymg whether or not, and when and how, 
transfer of sovereignty over Formosa be made to Chma, and from 
assertmg illegally that Formosa is not Chinese. To repeat, they 
are estopped from denying that Formosa is Chinese, though they 
may not be estopped from affirmmg so・
It is therefore an error for one to say that Formosa’s status 
is undetermined (with any form of reasoning), or that Formosa 
became Chmese territory due to the application of the Sino Japa-
nese Peace Treaty of 1952. It is even much more mistaken for one 
to suggest that Formosa’s status be determined by the General 
Assembly of the United Nat10ns or by “States concerned”； for 
there is no source of right for the UN or for individual States to 
do so Formosa’s status is never of their concern. There is no 
Juridical issue as to Formosa’s status; the quest10n of Formosa's 
status does not exist anymore. 
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But before such statement can be true, we meet with an op-
position, whicb is the c。mmonstarting-point of the negativist s 
about Chinese sovereignty over Formosa, to the effect that there 
has been no cession of Formosa from Japan to China namely, 
that in the San Francisco Peace Treaty (1951), as well as m the 
Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty (1952) in which Japan seems to have 
recognized that the Nationalist side is the only legitimate govern-
ment of China, although Japan did renounce al rights, etc. to 
Formosa, etc , she did not make clear to whom were such rights 
to be transferred, hence there was no cession at al. 
This argument, though it may be good reason m ordmary 
situat10n, is, however, hardly convincing in our case. It is an 
error to say that there was no cess10n at all, what, at the most, 
can possibly be said is that the cession was incomplete as a 
matter of formality. Japan’s renunciation of al rights to 
Formosa signifies that a cession was made on the part of the 
ceding State, and the fact that the name“China”was not ex-
pressly mentioned in correspondence to the act of ceding the 
territory, means only that in form the cess10n was in lack of 
somethmg. After al, once Japan gave up al rights over Formosa 
she can not have any claim about this territory. This means that 
a cession did take place. If this is so, then it remains to be seen 
whether, and to what extent, does the incompleteness of cession 
in our case mfluence the validity of the cession itself. 
In internat10nal law, under ordmary circumstance of transfer of 
territorial title, especially m case of making a peace treaty where 
disputes among the co-victors on terntonal disposal often occur, 
a cession m the complete form is required, or rather, desirable 
However, this is not an absolute rule, nor is it the only one on 
the matter. There were many cases in mtemational practice 
(customary mternational law) where transfers of territorial titles 
were completed but short of formal cessions at al. This is true, 
in particular, when such form of cession is not necessary in law, 
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that is, when it is clear enough as to leave no dispute on the 
territory the sovereignty over which is transferred, or when formal 
cession is politically undesirable 〔e.g, when such formal cession 
may stimulate unnecessary oppositions which, if there be no formal 
cess10n, would not appear). A formal cession is composed of two 
steps ( 1 ) thecedmg State renounces al rights, etc. to the ter・ 
ritory ceded, and ( 2〕itnames the State to which the territory 
is to be ceded. But what if the second step only is done. ? This 
is a good exception. 
Japan’s cess10n of Formosa to China possessed some of the above 
spec阻lcharacteristics, in an analogical sense Japan, once renou 
nced al her rights over Formosa, has nothing to do with this ter 
ritory anymore; the Principal Allied Powers, though seemingly 
they may have somethmg to say about the matter, are debarred 
from domg so, and other States and the Umted Nat10ns General 
Assembly, in lack of any source of rights whatever over Formosa, 
are not qualified to touch this problem. Nothing is clearer than 
this; that proves that Formosa has become Chinese territory. 
Thus, formal cession, not being absolute requirement for validity 
of a cession (though mcomplete), was not necessary in our case. 
It is even possible to argue that the omission m the above men-
honed peace treaties to name“China”the beneficiary of title to 
Formos", was due to the fact that Formosa’s status, once deter-
mmed by a treaty〔thePotsdam Proclamation, etc.), needed no 
more formal determination through cession in stricto s郎 suwhich, 
if so done, might have entailed unnecessary disputes and叩posi-
t10ns in 1951. After al, if the status of Formosa remains undeter-
mined, there must be a juridical basis, e. g., a treaty provision 
to which China is a party, to abrogate the “Potsdam-Proclamation・ 
Instrument-of-Surrender" accord. Without strong proofs to the 
contrary, that accord was validly executed. Thus, China has 
been legally in control of Formosa, and Japan’s renounciation in 
the peace treaty confirms this legal fact In law, no cession is 
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叩 oredefimte than this. It is not formal cession only, that can 
make Formosa Chinese territory, but is rather“Japan’s renuncia 
trnn of rights + no State on earth has a right to challenge Chmese 
,govereignty'', that makes Chma's title to Formosa complete. 
The functrnn of law is to keep status quo stable. Such stability 
is also desirable in the political world. The Natrnnahst side, bemg 
・one of the two entities of the Chinese State, has been ruling 
over Formosa for twenty years. It 1s juridically not possible, as 
well as politically inexpedient, not to recognize, with unjustifiable 
reasons and stramed logic that are in contradiction to the legal 
reality and pohtical facts, that Formosa has been Chinese territory 
•smce 1945. 
Moreover, denial to the Chinese State her sovereignty over 
Formosa may lead to international juridical coup d’品tat and 
・political absurdity. Such denial amounts to an internatrnnal juri-
・dical coup d’etat, because with the negative view the basic norms 
・on recognition, on State responsibility, and on State personality, 
・etc., would be altered from beginnmg to end. This could only 
be done through a universal treaty, before the negative assertion 
could be admitted , and internatrnnal law is not prepared to accept 
such alterations. Again, such negative assertion is politically 
absurd, because the imaginable resultant s1tuat10n would be that, 
for twenty years there has been m existence of a State, recognized 
by majority of governments of States on earth, without territory 
and without people, which situation is inconceivable if the recog-
nizmg States are s田ie.
The true picture is perhaps this, that, Formosa belongs to the 
Chinese State, but that due to the existence of the unique situa-
i:ion of split China (by the Chinese civil war, or civil strife if 
not recogmzed as civil war〕， demalbecomes possible as a matter 
.of power politics. Following as natural result of such special situa-
i:rnn is a localized cold-war in which some States remain m reco-
:gmtion of the Nationahst side, while some others recognize the 
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Commumst side the former States may contend, unconvincingly, 
that the contmmty of the Chmese State has been interrupted 
since 1949, hence the Commumst side can have no rights over 
Formosa, whereas the latter may mamtain, equally unjustifiably,. 
that the Nat10nahst side is a government-in-exile 〔rebels,accordmg 
to them〕， thathence Formosa belongs to the Communist side. 
Such ad hoc cold-war pros and cons immediately involves ques-
tions of recogmtion and UN Chinese representation which are the・ 
real issues of the China Problem, and which are closely related. 
by Formosa’s juridical status. 
IV. The real issues in the China Problem-Recognition and 
UN Chinese Representation ( I〕
As stated m the above, the focus of the China Proalem is the・ 
question “Single China, or Plural China ？”， and this question is 
determmed by Formosa’s status as teritory. Since this question in 
turn determines the issues of recogrifr10n and the UN Chmese 
representat10n, the status of Formosa also, logically, determines 
these two issues. Here we have a cham of juridical questions 
The first link of the cham is thus 1f Formosa were not Chinese 
territory, there would be in existence of one China represented by 
the Commumst side on mainland, and the entity on Formosa would 
be government・in-exileor another State not China , on the other 
hand, if Formosa be Chmese territory, as we have shown that 1t 
is, there can only be one China with two political entities, hence 
the law and order in this one Chma 1s not stable. 
Thus the solution could be: (a〕tomake through political means. 
the two entities into one〔aunited China), or (b) to make permanent 
partition of the two entities with peoples and terntones under 
their respective controls. And 1f these could not be done by an 
international war, this could only be done by mternat10nal agree-
ment consented to by the two entities Since Formosa is Chinese 
territory, there 1s no ground in law, and no way in politics except 
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by means of a war of intervention against both Chinese entities, 
that the plan of “＇Formosa by Form。sans”or“Formosathrough 
plebiscite・”be realized. 
The above paragraph is a juridical answer to solutions heretofore 
suggested by many. Due to the affirmative answer of the question 
“Is Formosa Chmese territory ？”， concervably there may be four 
hypotheses regarding the China Situat10n of today ：〔1〕Chmars 
in a state of C!Vll war; ( 2 ) Chma rs in a civil strife; ( 3 ) China 
C叩 beumted by politrcal means ; and 〔4) China can be made two 
different States (whether both be considered States sphtting from 
the old China, or one be considered successor to the old China thus 
the identity of the personality, and the continuity of the jundrcal 
order, of the Chmese State are kept intact, and the other one 
もeconsidered new”borned State〕Andsince both entities have been 
consistently opposed to the latter two hypotheses, the two former 
ones become obJect of田 alysrs.
If this is so, the second link of the chain comes into view : the 
relatrnns between the Single China and the recognition issue (by 
mdivrdual States〕， hencealso between the Single Chma and the 
issue of UN Chinese representatrnn (in an mternational organi-
泊 tron〕．
The issue of recognition and the issue of UN Chinese represen 
tatrnn are two sides of the same picture. However, they are not 
of the same weight for States (that is, whether their votes in UN 
follow recogmtions, or vice versa〕forsome States like the United 
Kingdom, recognition takes precedence over UN Chinese represent 
trnn ; for others hke Japan, vice versa, for stil others, the two 
issues are of equal weight (negatively m case of USA toward the 
・Communist side, affirmatively m case of USA toward the Nat10n-
ahst side, or correspondingly, affirmatively and negatively m 
・case of USSR〕， andto some other States hke those m Af口ca,
both of them may be of no weight 〔suchStates may not need a 
•Chir国 policy at al〕Theseare natural results from the special 
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meaning of the China Problem. 
In JU口drcallogic, the question wrth reference to the above two• 
inter・related real issues of the Chma Problem IS recognition of 
belligerency or of insurgency, and the UN Chinese representation 
issue ought to remam intact, until rt becomes possible for-
reahzatron of the other hypotheses 、1Vh1chhave been excluded in 
the above (hypotheses (3〕and.(4)). But what are now makmg: 
troubles for third States seem to be not in line wrth this conclu-
sion. And such has rts very root in the preconception about the• 
question of“recognition”and of “representation”m general: 
misunderstandingi:. of the principle of “one State, one government” 
in the former issue，国dof the prmcrple of“one State, one vote” 
in the latter issue. 
1. Recognrtron 
Strangely enugh, what has been in question for third States m 
handling the recogmtion issue of the Chma Problem 1s, as it were,. 
recognition of State and of government, rather than that of bel-
ligerency or of insurgency. This brings consequence to the pre-
sent dilemma-both Chinese entities claim to be the “only”legi-・ 
timate government of Chma, but there are Juridical as well as 
“political”d1f五cultiesfor many third States句 grantrecogmtion 
(or to cast their votes for/agamst such claim m the UN General 
Assembly). There are“political”(in the broad sense〕difficulties,.
because there exists an abnormal divided world situation of the 
cold war〔andeven of possibility for the commg mto bemg of a. 
Second UN composed of some Afro-Asian States not satisfied with 
the United Nations); there are juridical di田culties,hecause, v児、1Ving:
the China Situation objectively, there are m existence of two, and 
not one, political entities each controllmg part of Chma. to the 
exclusron of the other but neither bemg able to claim monopoly 
legit1macy, while theyinsist consistently that there is only one. 
China, which msistence is possible only if they recognize tnat 
they are at war against each other. 
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On this strange situation, deeper observation and more careful 
analysis must be made. And this touches the very foundat10n of 
the la、＂of recognit10n. 
The claim for monopoly legitimacy, on the formal side, is a 
request for recognition, by a new political entity given birth by a 
口vi war, a revolution, a civil strife, or a coup d’etat, in an 
existing State. Third States, in considering whether to grant 
recognition or not, ought to act in compliance with two legal 
-norms. These two norms are・ the rule of“effectivity”， and the 
rule of“one State, one government (exclusive right to represent 
the State)". The rule of“e仇ctivity”isthe necessary, and per 
haps juridically su伍cient,condit10n for application of the rule of 
“exclusive nght to represent the State". The former is the subs-
tantial, the latter the formal, condition governing recognit10n. 
A. The principle of e旺臼ctivity
This rule is the standard for judgment as to whether third States 
may or may not recognize as State or legitimate government a 
new entity e'tablished by force m violation of the Constitut10n of 
the State, or the test m the event of claim for prescriptive title to 
territory, etc. What concerns us here is the former case. This 
norm is supported by legal sanction against premature recognition 
m case recognit10n be gr国1tedto a new entity which has up to the 
moment of being recognized not been qualified to be so recognized. 
Premature recognition may be deemed unjustified intervention 
leadmg to international responsibility. Some writers even 
assert the other side of the picture an individual State, in 
the matter of granting or not granting recognition, acts on behalf 
of the mternat10nal community as a whole, hence if the new 
entity has fulfilled the conditions of e旺ectivity,witholding of 
recognition also invites international responsibility. This presup-
poses, inter alia, that States are under obligation to recognize a 
new entity if the latter has fulfilled the conditions provided by 
law. But it is problematical whether at the present state of inter 
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nat10nal law there is a legal norm to this e旺ect. Practice and 
oPino juris (Juridical conscience) shows that while States are under 
no legal obligat10n to recognize a new entity, the new entity is 
also not bound to be recogmzed by third States. Recogmtion is 
bilateral-one kind of agreement, hence consent between the reco 
gmzing and the recog即日dIS necessary. 
The concrete content of the prmc1ple of effectlvity is (a〕
that the new ent1ty shal! hold e'fect1ve sway over the territory to 
the exclusion of sovereignty of al other States or entities 
(power), and over the people in the sense that the people residmg 
on that part of territory it controls IS by and large m habitual 
obedience of its law (authority), and ( b ) that such situat10n tends 
to be permanent, that is, that there is reasonably no possibihty 
that this new entity be overthrown w1thm a foreseeable penod of 
time 
Th1s content applies to our case, and the salient po mt IS. whether 
the Chmese civ1l war IS stil m existence, and whether third States 
recogmze It as a state of ,.ar de 1ure (or, m case of civ1I strife, 
msurgency・de facto war). If bnth questions are answered in the 
affirmat1ve, then at th1s stage of a百a1rsin China as a whole third 
States may not be free w1thnut in breach of internat10nal law to 
recogmze as new State or as legitimate government the Com-
mumst s1de, and to w1thdraw recognition of the Nationalist side 
which has been recognized as legitimate government representing 
Chma. If, on the other haod, both questions are answered in 
the negative, then the present China Situat10n would be inexplam-
able If, further, the first question is answered m the a伍rmative,
while the latter, negative, then foreign States which do not grant 
such recognit10n b白 rpolit1cal and factual risks. If, agam, the 
自国tquestion is answered m the negative, while the latter ques-
ti on, in the a Iirmat1ve, th1s is a case of intervention m violat1on 
of internat10nal law. 
This is the 1urid1cal p1cture. However, States seem not to 
Juridi団 lAdmissibility of a s。luti。nto the 
conform to this lme. Many of them thmk that they are obliged 
by・ facts to change recognition pohcy toward China. 
This is due to a false conception of the rule of e旺ectivity
It is very unfortunate that writers on this issue put too much 
weight on the affirmative aspect of effectivity, and overlook the 
刀egativeaspect of same 
The content of the rule of e旺ectlvityas having been followed 
by many States is understood m its affirmative meaning. But in 
it there is a negative imphcation. The negative aspect of the 
rule is that目 whilethe rebels (A〕inthe civil strife must hold 
e古田tivecontrol, the legitimate government (BJ must have ceased 
to exist or, even if B exists, it must be unable to challenge A due 
to complete military impotence. In case B controls part of the 
State and people residing thereon as against A for a considerable 
period, what matters for judgement of “e宜ectivity”isnot“how 
1rage IS B’s controllable territory and how big is the number of 
people on it”m comparison with A’s, but rather “whether B stil 
holds effective control of other part of people and territory田1d
1s strong enough to make possible (not probable) the reopennmg 
{or contmuatlon〕ofthe civil strife." In this case, B’s effective 
・Control signifies the ine町民tivecontrol of its rival. Hence, if the 
.answer to the latter questi叩 ism the a伍rmative,then A as a 
party to the civil strife can not be said to have effective control 
•over territory and people of the State “Effectivity”is not a 
quantitative concept, but is an exclusive one remaming in the 
boundary of possibility and relativity This, considered in terms 
・of the aim of the parties to the civil strife, becomes evident. 
.Provided neither party would change its war aim, and sofar as 
the aim is “to自ghtto the end for legitimacy”（on the part of the 
revolut10nists）皿d“toput down the revolut10n”（on the part of 
the legitimate government〕， andnot secession or independence (i. 
・e., m case of“rebelhon”）， there is田 all-or-nothingpictu町田d
no compromise is contemplated, hence neither party could be con-
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sidered m effective control of the territory and people of the State, 
so long as the ClVll stnfe goes on on the territory of the State. 
This is exactly the present picture in China. 
This negative asp配 tof the rule of effectivity may be termed 
“presumption of meffective control”， in favour of the established 
government. The prima facie test lies in the fact whether the 
seemingly defeated pa,rty is or is not able to reopen the civil 
struggle, regardless of 、＂hetherit is probably for it to、，mi江
such struggle, for this point is to be determined by the 
stnfe. 
Thus, though the Cnmmumst side is said to be m control 
of six hundred million people and 9,590,000 square-kilometer of 
territory, its control is not effective, because it is not final in the 
context of its aim of exclusive legitimacy The co-existence of the 
two Chmese entities is the basic cause of the China Problem,. 
and it brmgs with it significant meanings m any judgement of 
e旺ectivityas condition to recognition. Many may doubt whether 
the Nationalist side is strong enough to return to the mainland, 
but nobody can doubt that it, at least at the present, has suf-
ficient strength to make reopennmg (or continuation) of the civil 
strife probable, and not only possible; and, m fact, suct stnfe is. 
gomg on. Thus the existence of the Nat10nahst side menaces the 
permanency of sway over mainland on the part of the Communist 
side; and there seems no reason why we can, less must, accept the 
claim of the Communist side that its control over 
mg Formosa) is e旺ectiveif it insists upon the aim of rubbing out 
the Nat10nalist side from the picture. This aim, evidently, has" 
so far, not been realized. Politically, one may push to the extre-
mity and judge that an entity is in effective control even if m 
fact it controls only a territory of ten square mlles with ten 
thousand people, but the law does not recognize that an entity is 
m effective control of the State, if and so long as its permanency 
is put in constant danger by a civil armed struggle and its inal 
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terable aim remains slogan. The claim put forth by the Com-
munist side is self-contradictory ; and al on this probl~m miss. 
the real meaning of the term“effective control”・
One may on ideological ground, as the Communist side does, 
argue that the existence of the Nationalist side on Formosa is due• 
“only”to the supports of USA (the asserted US illegal occupation 
of Formosa) hence that the Nationalist side is tantamount to non-
existent. But in law the Umted States which contmues to recog-
nize the Nationalist side as the legitimate government of China, 
is, on the basis of treaty or upon request by that government. 
(consent), legal to assist this government; and in politics, such is. 
the natural and necessary result of the pr田entworld-struggle If 
the Communist side claims effective control, it perhaps may claim 
so only insofar as mamland is concerned. But it claims more ; it
claims sovereignty over Formosa which is under effective control 
of its rival. And such claim can make sense, only when one thmks. 
that the Communist side has “constructive", and not real, control 
over Formosa. But one may with equal reason argue that the. 
Nationalist side also holds constructive control over mainland ' 
One step further, if Formosa became Chinese territory m 1945・ 
when Chma declared it a Chinese provmce, and not in 1952 when・ 
the Sino・ Japanese Peace Treaty came into effect (confirmmg Chi-
nese sovereignty with retroactive e旺ectup to 1945), since the• 
Nationalist side is now reigning over a part of ten itηry of the・ 
Chinese State, it is even possible and reasonable for us to consider 
that the Chmese civil war continues to exist even as of today. 
This is so if one adopts the theory that war is a 1uridical state・ 
of a町airsand not action. This is perhaps the correct 1uridical 
interpretation of the present situation in Chma, and indeed this. 
may be the best hmt for a solution to the China Problem. 
However, many, relying upon ideology, consider that the Chinese・ 
Civil War ended at 1949 when the Communist side declared itself 
government of China This is possible only if one adopts the theory 
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that war is action and not "tate of affairs. In any case, the fact 
that civil strife m China is alway" probable, remョinstrue. Choice 
on either of the theories on the structure of war is made use of 
by ideologies, but Judgement of effectivity 1s, and always remams, 
jund1cal!y relevant. 
B. The exclusive right to represent the State 
If the Commumst side as a new entity does not pass the test of 
the nagative rule 1mphed m the principle of effectivity, then it is 
m law not qualified to claim the exclusive right to represent the 
Chmese State. 
The rule “one State, one gnvernment”is founded on the concept 
・of mdiv1s1bility of State personality. This concept m turn has its 
root in the political theory of State sovereignty. And the content 
of this principle is : ( a ) thatdomestically there can be one, and 
・only one, group of ehtes, be it called government, regime, entity, 
to exercise the supreme po、.verover a territory and a people , and 
( b) that mternat10nally, there can be only one de iure govern-
ment representing the State in contact with foreign States. 
But we must say that while (a ) may be true, ( b) is subject 
to serious doubts. 
There are except10ns to the rule recogmt10n of belligerency 
makes a civil strife (war de facto) into a civil war (war de 
jure), thus gives the parties at war limited and provisional person・ 
alities〔limited,that is, for the purpose of the civil war only, 
and provisional, that is, so long as the war continues), in which 
case the war becomes internationally relevant and no more 
remains domestic affair. Furthermore, recognition is also possible 
in case of cml strife (insurgency, or, more correctly, quasi・state
of civil war). It is even possible in law for third States to reco 
.gmze two governments m a State, one de jure, the other, de 
facto, temporarily. The concept“recognition”m al these cases 
C田 bemeaningful, only with the presupposition that there exist 
“governments”（if this term is improper, then we may put the 
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term“entities”in its stead) The pomt is not whether such: 
recogmt10n is normal or not (and al will of course agree that th<> 
present situation m Chma is not normal〕，butrather that such ex-
ceptions have been made for the purpose of adapting the la胃 t。
facts. And there is of course in China a s1tuat10n (a fact〕t。
which mternat10nal law is not adapted, hence such fact requires 
another exception to the rule of “one State, one government”， 
pendmg for古田Idetermination of the status of the rival parties. 
to the civil war (or civil strife〕whichis now being carried on 
Lex ferenda, international law sh。uldhave a norm for recognitioll' 
of quasi-belligerency which stands between belligerency and in-
surgency, so as to legalize and regulate the act of prov1s10nal and 
temporary recogmtion of the dual government situation. 
But on this States also act ambiguously. 
Such lack of harmony between the norm and acts of States on 
the principle of effectivity and the rule “one State, one govern-・ 
ment”is due, besides to the misunderstandmgs of the prin 
ciples now m question, also to the fact that recognition, though 
a matter of law, is also a matter of policy 〔pol!ticalnature). Al 
though restricted by mternational law, act of recognition is consi-
dered matter of policy of individual State, subiect to its national 
interests and to mutual feints between this State and other third 
States (the international environment for deciding to grant or not 
to grant recognition to a new entity by this State). Thus, 
recognition, on the one hand, funct10ns as legal institution, on 
the other hand, is to quite great extent subject to“political” 
considerat10ns 
From this it may he concluded that in the Chma Problem third' 
States are free to grant recognition to each of the two rival 
parties in the struggle, but that they bear risks for their judgements 
in their respective pol!cy 
ness in cognizance of the fact 。fef田 tivecontrol, and correctness 
and iustification of interpretation as to the applicat10n of the norm 
140 
・of e町民tivity.At the present stage of internatonal law, extremely 
st口ctlegal rules do not provide for a solution to the China Problem 
咽rother problems of similar nature. Here lies the danger of legal・ 
formalism. The China Problem, in other words, is a typical case 
'suggestmg a reconsideratrnn of apphcatrnn of the norm of effect 
'1v1ty, and of the act of recogmtrnn itself. Recognition of the new 
entity does not solve the Problem-the reality of quasi-belliger・ 
•ency continues to exist. 
V. The real issue in the China Problem-Recognition and UN 
Chinese representation (II) 
2. UN Chmese Representation 
If the status of Formosa is strictly Juridical, and the 1Ssue 
’・of recognition more juridical than pohtical, the issue of UN Chmese 
representatrnn is more political than 1uridica!. It is less juridical, 
m the sense that 1t is only procedurally regulated hy the UN 
・Charter which is a multilateral treaty, and that normative substan・ 
tial standard for cogmzance of changes of facts 1s absent or, 
-even if it exists, 1t is so abstract that extremely antagomstic 
interpretations, which come from different ideologies and political 
motives, are both possible and seemingly maintamable, according 
to the wordings of the provis10n regulating the matter (Article 4 
of the UN Charter on membership, which 1s not the proper 
・provision to be apphed m the Chinese representation !Ssue). And 
'it is more pohtical in nature, in the sense that, differed from 
recogmt1on which is a legal institution, 1t 1s pre・ju口d1cal,that 
1s, quasi・leg1slative (through castmg a vote). It follows that 
while recognition 1s b!lateral act hased upon consent of two Stat田，
hence is, and remains, withm the powers and at the risks of indi・ 
-v1dual States making judgment; voting in the UN General Asse・ 
mbly for or against the claim for the exclusive right to repre・ 
•sent the State by one of the political entities of a single State 
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<loes not involve juridical respons1b11ity of the State that so votes; 
for the dec1s10n which is juridically valid and pol!tically e百ective
is a collective (rather, corporate) one, that 1s, it is the decision 
-0f the Umted Nations, and not of any "ingle State-no single State 
・can (politically〕oris competent to (Juridically〕make"uch decrnion. 
1t stands to reason that叩 theone hand, d配 is10nof the UN (on 
such issue), which, being quasi legislative, 1s mdependent of any 
single will of a State voted, and of the collctive will that has been 
expressed in this decision, is constitutive of the a侃rmative
iundical q uah自cationof one of the ent1t1es claiming the right to 
representation, and of the negative juridical quali自cat10nof the 
・other entity that lost such right as a result of such deci"1on On 
the other hand, the decision bemg a collective one, individual State 
votmg for or again•t the entity which is at length recognized 
"uch right to representat10n, may mamtain or change its recogni-
t10n policy toward this entity and its rival. Thus there come two 
quest10ns. ( 1) whether the entity that lost the right to represent 
the State in an international orgamzat1on may. as domestic ruler 
and as a body m contact with individual foreign States, remain as 
legitimate government of the State, at least msofar concermng 
the States that do not as a result of the UN decision withdraw 
their recogmt10n of this entity ; and ( 2 ) astheoret)cal problem 
whether a State that voted for an entity in the UN General As-
sembly 〔orat the Security Council〕maywithhold her recognition 
-of such entity. The correct answers to these two questions he 
in the answer to a more general and profound question・ whether 
as a matter of procedure r田 ognitiontakes precedence over UN 
representation, or vice versa. 
This is not a question of law, but one of pohtical attitude; that 
is, accordmg as an mdiv1dual State considers the UN as centre 
for, as parallel to, or as subject to, her foreign policy principle 
But what is clear is that practice shows that, whereas recognition 
<Jf an entity of China by a State will, with very few except10ns 
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like the United Kingdom, be followed by a節目nativevote for that 
recognized entity on the representation issue in the UN ; a而rma-
tive vote for the unrecognized enitlty by a third Stateロ＞aynot be 
understood as prelude to recognition. But such are only matter 
of tendency, and not, at least not yet, matter of legal obligations. 
On the UN Chinese representation issue itself, similar to the 
case of discussing recognit10n, due to the mixed nature (Juridical 
and political〕ofthe issue, we do not intend to discuss legal tech・ 
niques〕onsuch technique or juridical procedural aspect of the issue, 
there have been many excellent articles and volumes), but rather 
to discuss the more fundamental points which are bases for, or 
assu口＞pt10nsof, d1scuss10ns of techniques and the procedural aspect 
。fthe issue 
The issue of UN Chinese representation, as havmg been pomted 
out, is one of the faces of the same picture (status of the two 
Chmese entities, the other face bemg recogmt10n〕. The UN Chi・ 
nese representat10n issue and the recognition issue are mutually 
related not only because they are connected by the issue of For・ 
mosa’s status, m the sense that the latter determmes, or 
suggests objective criteria for considerat10ns m policy・makmg 
regardmg both of the former issues, but because both have the 
same legal and political root legitimacy of a government. 
Legitimacy of a government (monopolistic legitimacy), coming 
from the principle of mtegrity of State personality which in turn 
has as its source the poht!cal concept of State sovereignty, is 
expressed on the formal plane m the claim of exclusive nght to 
represent the State. But it has different meaning for rerngnition 
by mdividual third States and for representation m an international 
organization. For a newly established political entity recogmt10n 
concerns its “contact”with the States that recognize it, in the m-
ternational so口etyas a whole and regulated hy general 〔customary)
mternational law; while representation in an international organiza-
tion concerns its “participation”in a particular community estahl-
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1shed by special treaty. 
The d1伍cultyof solving the UN Chinese representation issue 
lies m the concept of Juridical equality of sovereign states (Article 
2 of the UN Charter〕， whichresults with the prmc1ple of “one 
State, one vote”. It is owing to the existence of this prmc1ple, 
that writers spent much time in try mg to solve the China Problem 
in many a directions (successor-State style, split・State style, 
status・quo・mamtainmg style, and status・quo-overturnmg style., 
Though it may be an exaggeration if we say that al such ende 
avours are made m vam, at least we may justly say that most of 
these directions for which so much energy has been spent are 
misleading. They have not caught the kernel of the 1Ssue. 
The UN Chinese representat10n issue 1s peculiar, in comparison 
with the !Ssue of representat10n in other mternat10nal organiza-
t10ns. It consists of two questions the solutions to which .may not 
be the same: one is the question of seat m the General Assembly 
and in other specialized agencies , the other is the quest10n of 
vote in the Security Council. This is due to the structural speci-
alty of the UN While the former is matter of representat10n 
properly so called, the latter, better called matter of “veto-
possession”（note that even a non-permanent member of the Security 
Council may in some sense be considered m possession of a quasi-
veto). 
In our issue, these two questions meet at the pomt of identity 
of State which finds its express10n in continuity of membership 
in the UN. It is exactly this point that brmgs headache to al 
concerned. If such continuity can be ignored in law, that 1s, if 
the Chinese State can be deemed non-existent after the Commumst 
side’s d配 lanngitself “the”government of Chma, the result would, 
according to Juridical logic, be that there are two new States 
split from the old Chinese State. The impossibility in juridical 
conception of a vacuum in the existence of a State is the focus 
of this issue. 
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There exist a few pre::edents about “representation”dispute in the 
UN, but none of them can be applied to the Chma situat10n. This 1s 
so, not only owmg to the“veto possess10n”matter, but also to the 
very fact that while the new entity, that 1s, the Communist side, 
has been recognized by many States (some of which, hke North 
Korea, are for the UN no States at al), the traditional legitimate 
government continues to be recognEed by the maiority of States 
members to the UN. Thus we return to the question of quasi・ 
belligerency, and once more we meet with the political crimmations 
and recrimmations on monopolistic leg1t1macy of a government. 
Here the traditional principle ‘＇one State, one vote”， which has 
been taken for granted, comes into view. It must be subject to 
scrupulous and deeper perusal 
While the rule “one State, one government”has been consistently 
mamtahied in the mternational society, m the sense that its very 
few except10ns (recognition of belhgerency etc ) stand only as 
temporary or transitional measures for the sake of expediencies; 
the prmciple of“one State, one vote”m the UN 1s rather loose 
from the beginnmg,in the sense that many exceptions〔USSR,though 
a Bundesstaat, has 3 votes, Great Britain, a Staatenbund, many〕were
made with permanency. While iurid1cal and political equality of 
sovereignty 1s by and large realized in case of“contacts”among 
individual States, m the UN as well as m other mternatinnal 
organi!ations, such equality has never been realized. This im・ 
mediately mvolves two points: ( 1) in general, the proportion of 
weights of votes with relation to populat10ns, territories, and 
power resources both quantitatively and qualitatively, of ind1v1dual 
States members to an internat10nal organization (question of 
majority tyranny) becomes c口tical;(2) m particular, the Law of 
the Umted Nations is even based on the concept ofmequality of 
State sovereignty (a ) the veto system gives the Great Powers 
privileges; (b) m the Dumbarton Oaks Conference which drafted 
the Charter, Soviet Union claimed 16 votes and got 3, and suggested 
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i:hat USA also held 3 votes〔theBritish Commonwealth got 6 votes). 
President Roosevelt tended to accept such suggestion, but at length 
-dropped it, due not to consideration of sovereign equality but to 
domestic oppositions It may be argued that such are al based on 
既pressconsents from al member States. But the point is not 
the concept of“self-limitation”of States concerned, which is an 
effective interpretation of the“consent theory.” The point 1s : 
the phenomenon pf sovereign inequality remams true. 
The exception to the principle of “one State, one vote”in the 
UN is a reality. It is a result of politic al compromise due to nee es-
'sity. In the sense that the Soviet Union has more possibihties to 
have its parts (the two Republics that hold independent votes in the 
General Assembly) elected non-permanent member (s〕of the 
Security Council than other states have, its plural-vote position 
.also brings to it more privilege than the veto itself. It is certainly 
true for saying that due to the veto right held by the Soviet 
Union as a whole (a Bundesstaat-style State), such plural vote 
position bears immate口alin自uenceat the Security Council ; none 
the less it is no less true in saymg that structurally the plural-
vote situation exists also in the Security Council. Such prlVlleged 
position becomes more evident, when we conceive the affirmative 
side of a vote m a decision at the Secu口tyCouncil, in case of 
・composmg a ma1ority vote on certam matter. The result, after al, 
is no less serious than that of the negative function of a veto. 
Thus, in both the General Assembly and the Security Council 
there are permanent exceptions to the prmc1ple of “one State, 
one vote”. The “vote”question appears more commissional and 
arti日cialthan it is natural. It therefore 1s subject to pohtical 
expediencies. With this picture in mind, we may perbaps say 
that there 1s another possible line for a solution to the China 
Problem, and a new line for a China policy of individual States. 
If the China Problem is one of serious international concern, there 
would be no good reason why another exception, and temporary 
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exception, may not be made through polit1cal compromise. 
Conclusion 
From the above observations our conclus10n oil the Chma 
Problem is threefold. First, Formosa’s iund1cal status, which de-
termines quest10n of“smgle Chma, or plural Chma”which, in 
turn, controls the issue of r田 ogmtionand the issue of UN Chinese 
representation, has been settled in 1945, hence it no more is an 
issue of the China Problem. Secondly, the issue of recogmtion is. 
left free for States concerned, accordmg to their respective consi-
derat10ns on their national mterests, arrd with risks as to their 
respective Judgments It is to he added that recognition of tw<> 
governments is legally admitted. Thirdly, on the issue of UN 
Chinese representati'on, we do not suggest any single solut10n. 
Instead, we suggest another lme as agamst the falsehood of th<> 
principle of “one State, one vote”in an international organization. 
Within this hne, there are many possible solutions ：“plural vote” 
in the General Assembly and “rotation-representation”at th<> 
Security Council 〔itmay be helpful to add that there was an 
analogical pr日cedentin China in the 1920’s, and possibly were some・ 
other similar cases in diplomatic history). Meanwhile, we must 
stress that, as Juridical analysis and factual situat10n show, a 
solution, to be more realizable, can not ignore the following 
guide ・ the China Problem can be solved only provisionally, m th<> 
sense that, pending 百四lsettlement, lack of great changes in 
China, for the time bemg such solut10n must be based on“one-
China" Short of an international war, which will b口ngto th<> 
world higher degree of destruction than the existence of the China. 
Problem itself will, there is no possibility for realization of a 
situat10n of plural-Chma , and exceptmg plural-Chma, the way left 
for us is a smgle China. 
Here comes a new point Even if the prev10us statement be true, 
it may be argued that our lme is perhaps futile, seeing that the 
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Communist side has declared its intention to make another “United 
Nations" as aga,mst the existing one. 
Such argu口ient,though it might be signi白cantpolitically, is 
beside the point here. Whether a “Second United Nations" may 
・come into being awaits for proof by facts, and it is highly probable 
that this remains one sort of oral and ad h田 tactics. In this 
.article, we stop at the discovery of another !me for consideration 
・Of a Chma pol!cy by individual States at the present stage of 
world affairs, and discard the questions of desirability and 
practicability of a single solution that may come from such line. 
In law, desirability and practicability田cupyno positions. Whether 
a solut10n may be desirable or practicable, and even whether a 
line is useful or futile, will depend on techniques, changes of 
mternat10nal environment, and domestic situations of the individual 
States. We provide only another criterion JUr1d1cally admissible. 
Other works are left for other studies from di旺erentpomts of 
view. After al, facts are changeゆleand changing. While al 
must follow the reality at a certain historical point of time, none 
of us can predict with certainty the extent of changeability of 
facts. It may be useful to repeathere, that the best soluti叩 to
the China Problem is perhaps Time itself. 
-The End-
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